Protest at sea: An analysis of the Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013 by McMenamin, Matthew
 MATTHEW MCMENAMIN 
 
 
PROTEST AT SEA: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CROWN MINERALS 
AMENDMENT ACT 2013 
 
 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS 524: HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
2013 
 
 
 
  
 
2 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the criminal offences introduced under the Crown Minerals 
Amendment Act 2013 in response to direct action protest at sea. These offences have 
proved controversial as they restrict fundamental protest rights and purport to apply in 
respect of foreign vessels beyond New Zealand’s territory. This paper advances two 
central propositions in relation to these offences. First, the prescription and enforcement 
of the offences is permitted under the jurisdiction accorded to New Zealand at 
international law. Second, the limitations placed upon protest rights are justified in 
accordance with s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
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I Introduction  
Vast untapped oil, natural gas and mineral resources exist off the coast of New Zealand, 
the exploration and exploitation of which promises economic prosperity. However, deep-
set environmentalist opposition to the exploitation of such resources has led to significant 
protest action both within New Zealand and across the world. Asserting the freedoms of 
expression and peaceful assembly, protest groups such as Greenpeace have taken to the 
seas in an effort to raise awareness and physically obstruct the exploitation of these 
resources. 
In New Zealand, the conflict between offshore exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources and obstructive protest action has motivated the Hon Simon Bridges to 
introduce two new classes of criminal conduct. By virtue of Supplementary Order Paper 
205, the Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013 (Amendment Act) criminalises both 
interference with a structure or operation in an offshore area and the entry into a specified 
non-interference zone established around a structure or ship engaged in the exploration or 
exploitation of offshore oil, gas or mineral resources.1 These offences have provoked 
controversy as they expressly apply extraterritorially, to both New Zealand and foreign 
vessels, and interfere with the fundamental rights to freedom of navigation and peaceful 
protest.2  
This paper examines the controversial elements of the new offences in order to advance 
two central propositions. The first proposition is that the prescription and enforcement of 
the offences introduced by the Amendment Act are within the jurisdiction accorded to 
New Zealand under international law. The second proposition is that the offences are 
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
Part II of this paper will first explain the factual context of the Amendment Act and 
important foundational concepts in the law of the sea before moving to Part III which 
introduces the criminal offences established under the Amendment Act. Part IV will then 
advance the position that the Amendment Act does not exceed New Zealand’s 
jurisdiction under international law. The governing principle is that jurisdiction is 
primarily territorial and therefore this part distinguishes between jurisdiction within the 
  
1  Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013, s 55. 
2  See for example Greenpeace “Defend the Right to Peaceful Protest at Sea: Reject the Anadarko 
Amendment” <www.greenpeace.org>; (16 April 2013) 689 NZPD 9358. The Process by which the 
offences became law has also been subject to critique: Green Party “Govt abuses urgency to extend 
Anadarko Amendment” (press release, 17 May 2013). 
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territorial sea and jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. The most contentious issue in 
Part IV is whether the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea accords New 
Zealand the jurisdiction to enact the new offences, and enforce those offences, beyond the 
territorial sea with respect to foreign protest vessels. This paper argues that it does confer 
this jurisdiction because the offences introduced in the Amendment Act are a reasonable 
exercise of coastal state rights to explore and exploit the resources in the continental shelf 
and are a justified limitation upon freedom of navigation. Part V then turns to the tension 
between the offences and protest rights. The offences restrict protestors’ freedom of 
expression, peaceful assembly, and – within the territorial sea – freedom of movement. 
However, this paper argues that these restrictions are justified in a free and democratic 
society, in accordance with s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
II Fundamental Concepts and Context  
A Maritime Zones and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3 has been 
described as a “constitution” for the oceans4 and governs contemporary law of the sea.5 
The provisions of UNCLOS will inform the assessment of New Zealand’s jurisdiction 
under international law. At this preliminary stage, however, it is important to introduce 
the concepts of coastal states, flag states and maritime zones, as these concepts are 
fundamental to the framework set out in UNCLOS.  
The coastal state is the state whose territory is adjacent to the relevant area of the ocean. 
For present purposes, the coastal state is New Zealand. A flag state is the state which has 
granted a ship the right to sail under its flag.6 Within New Zealand, a foreign ship is any 
ship that is not, and is not entitled to be, registered under the Ship Registration Act 1992.7 
The rights and obligations accorded to coastal state and flag states under UNCLOS differ 
between the various maritime zones. 
  
3  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 397 (opened for signature 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
4  Tommy TB Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea “A 
Constitution for the Oceans” (6 and 11 December 1982) Oceans and Law of the Sea: United Nations 
<www.un.org>.       
5  Malcolm D Evans “The Law of the Sea” in Malcolm D Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 651 at 653. 
6    Robin R Churchill and Alan V Lowe The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1999) at 211. 
7   Maritime Transport Act 1994, s 2(1). 
  
 
6 
 
The relevant zones for the purposes of this paper are the territorial sea, the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf. The territorial sea is the area of sea 
directly adjacent to the land. It extends 12 nautical miles from the baseline, which is 
drawn at the intersection of the shore and the Lowest Astronomical Tide.8 The EEZ is the 
area of water beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea that extends 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline.9 The area of New Zealand’s EEZ is four million square kilometres.10 
The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submerged prolongation of 
the land mass of the coastal state beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.11 The area of New Zealand’s continental shelf that extends beyond 
the EEZ is 1.7 million square kilometres.12  
B Petroleum, Minerals and the New Zealand Economy  
As the Amendment Act restricts protest against the prospecting, exploration and mining 
of offshore resources, a brief introduction to such activities is now provided. There are 
three stages in the exploitation of offshore petroleum and mineral resources. First, 
prospecting activities are “undertaken for the purpose of identifying land likely to contain 
mineral deposits or occurrences” and may include seismic surveys.13 Exploration 
activities are then “undertaken for the purpose of identifying mineral deposits or 
occurrences and evaluating the feasibility of mining particular deposits or occurrences” 
and may include drilling, dredging or excavation.14 If feasible, mining activities follow. 
This may include the development of necessary production facilities and well drilling for 
the purposes of extraction.15 In order to undertake these activities, a permit must be 
obtained from the Minister of Energy under s 25 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
  
8  UNCLOS, arts 3–6; Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, ss 3, 
5, 6 and 6A. Section 2 identifies that 1 nautical mile is equal to 1.852 kilometers.    
9  UNCLOS, art 57; Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, s 9. 
10   Ministry for the Environment Managing Our Oceans: A Discussion Document on the Regulations 
Imposed under the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 
(ME 1090, May 2012) at vii.    
11  UNCLOS, art 76; Continental Shelf Act 1964, s 2(1). Note that if the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline, then the coastal state is entitled to a 
continental shelf of 200 nautical miles. 
12   Helen Clark “UN recognises NZ’s extended seabed rights” (press release, 22 September 2008); 
Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in regard to the 
Submission made by New Zealand 19 April 2006 (CLCS 54, 2008).   
13   Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 2(1). 
14   Crown Minerals Act, s 2(1). 
15  Crown Minerals Act, s 2(1); New Zealand Petroleum and Minerals Guide to Government 
Management of Petroleum (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2013) at 2. 
  
 
7 
 
Additionally, marine consents are required from the Environmental Protection Authority 
for activities, such as exploratory drilling, that are not permitted in the Regulations under 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012.16 
The first application for a prospecting permit extending beyond New Zealand’s EEZ to 
the limits of the outer continental shelf was submitted to the Minister for Energy on the 6 
May 2013.17 
Currently, New Zealand’s only petroleum producing fields are within the Taranaki Basin. 
In particular, the Maari and Pohokura offshore oil fields dominate oil production and 
produced over 53 per cent of New Zealand’s oil in 2012.18 New Zealand’s other deep 
water basins are underexplored, yet the Government considers there is significant 
potential for commercial hydrocarbon discoveries.19 To this end, the Government’s 
Business Growth Agenda seeks to “encourage a more positive environment for 
international investment” in order to realise the full economic potential of the resources.20 
As the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) reported on 4 
September 2013, the petroleum and minerals sector is the most productive in New 
Zealand’s economy.21 Petroleum and minerals exports have tripled since 2002 and, with 
the exclusion of coal, were worth $2,797 million in 2012.22  
C Police v Teddy, Direct Action Protest and the Cost of Interference 
Organisations such as Greenpeace have taken to the oceans to protest against the 
increasing exploration and exploitation of offshore minerals and resources. In New 
Zealand, the most significant recent offshore protest was carried out by Greenpeace and 
East Cape iwi in April 2011. During this protest, Mr Teddy sailed the fishing vessel San 
Pietro within 20 metres of the bow of the Orient Explorer. This occurred outside of New 
Zealand’s territorial sea, but within the EEZ. The Orient Explorer was conducting a 
seismic survey of the Raukumara Basin off the East Coast, on behalf of Petrobras, a 
  
16  Guide to Government Management of Petroleum, above n 15, at 2. 
17   “Recent Applications Received and Granted: Petroleum” (6 May 2013) NZ Petroleum and Minerals 
<www.nzpam.govt.nz>; “Map of Active New Zealand Petroleum Permits” NZ Petroleum and 
Minerals <www.nzpam.govt.nz>. 
18  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment New Zealand Sectors Report 2013: Petroleum 
and Minerals (4 September 2013) at 79 [Sectors Report 2013]. 
19  Sectors Report 2013, above n 18, at 23. 
20  At 10–11, 20 and 79.  
21  At 10. 
22  At 10. 
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Brazilian oil and gas exploration company.23 These protests form the factual matrix of the 
High Court decision Police v Teddy.24  
Mr Teddy was charged and convicted under s 65(1)(a) of the Maritime Transport Act 
1994 with the offence of operating a ship in a manner that causes unnecessary danger or 
risk to any other person. Although the High Court held that the presumption against the 
extraterritorial application of New Zealand law was rebutted, conviction rested upon the 
fact that San Pietro was a New Zealand vessel. The Court recognised that the same action 
could not have been taken against a person on board a foreign vessel. The protests from 
which Police v Teddy stemmed highlighted for Cabinet the “need for a clearer legal 
framework and policing and other enforcement powers” applicable with respect to both 
New Zealand and foreign vessels.25  
Teddy’s protest was an example of non-violent direct action protest. The phrase ‘direct 
action’ describes protest that has the purpose of physically obstructing the activity 
protested against. It may be violent or non-violent.26 Violent direct action tactics, such as 
severely damaging or ramming ships, have been used in the past by Sea Shepherd against 
ships engaged in whaling.27 Non-violent direct action protests tend to employ passive 
human shield tactics.28 This can include navigating high speed protest boats, or placing 
swimmers, directly in the path of danger.29 A recent example of such tactics occurred on 
22 September 2013 when 50 protestors jumped into the Giudecca Canal in Venice to 
obstruct the passage of cruise ships leaving port.30   
  
23  Ministry of Economic Development Petroleum Exploration Permit 52707 (1 June 2010); “Brazilian 
oil giant Petrobras dumps NZ exploration permits” New Zealand Herald (online ed, New Zealand, 4 
December 2012).  
24    Police v Teddy [2013] NZHC 432, [2013] NZAR 299, at [1]–[2]. 
25   Cabinet Business Committee “Protection of offshore petroleum and mineral activity from unlawful 
interference” at [8] and [24] (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment). 
26   Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson “Direct Action, Convention Values and the Human Rights 
Act” (2001) 21 LS 535 at 540–541.  
27  Glen Plant “International Law and Direct Action Protests at Sea: Twenty Years On” (2002) 33 
NYIL 75 at 80. 
28   Plant, above n 27, at 97. 
29  See for example Plant, above n 27, at 97–98; Ron Smith “Terrorism, Protest and the Law: In a 
Maritime Context” (2008–2009) 11–12 YN NZ Juris 61 at 64. 
30  Tom Kington “Protestors dive into Venice canal to block cruise ships” (22 September 2013) The 
Telegraph <www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
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Non-violent direct action can be contrasted with communicative protest, which has only 
an incidental effect upon the activity protested against.31 However, most protests at sea 
take the form of direct action because of the considerable costs and resources involved in 
orchestrating such protest.32 If purely communicative protest does occur, it will normally 
occur in tandem with direct action. For example, in Drieman and Others v Norway a 
Greenpeace protest vessel shadowed the Senet, a Norwegian whaling ship, for a month 
before repeatedly positioning themselves in front of her bow and thereby forcing her to 
alter course.33  
Non-violent direct action protest at sea can impose significant costs upon companies 
engaged in prospecting, exploration or mining activities if they are forced to veer off 
course or postpone their operations.34 Vessels engaged in seismic surveying, for example, 
cannot stop immediately and, if faced with human shield protest tactics, would 
necessarily need to veer off course to avoid endangering life.35 Non-violent direct action 
also gives rise to safety concerns for both the protestors and the workers on board the 
target vessel or structure.36   
D The Purpose of the New Offences  
The impetus for the new offences was a combination of the recognition of the deleterious 
effects of direct action protest at sea and requests from the oil and gas industry for “a 
more robust government response to threats of, and actual, direct protest action”.37 
Cabinet was concerned that the status quo, limited in its application to New Zealand 
vessels, could damage “New Zealand’s reputation for having a predictable and stable 
investment environment” and may “discourage petroleum and mineral exploration 
companies” from investing in New Zealand.38 Section 6 of the Amendment Act provides 
that its purpose is “to promote prospecting for, exploration for, and mining of, Crown-
  
31   Fenwick and Phillipson, above n 26, at 540–541. 
32   Plant, above n 27, at 99.  
33   Drieman and Others v Norway (33678/96) Third Section, ECHR 4 May 2000. 
34  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Regulatory Impact Statement: Protection of 
offshore petroleum and mineral activity from unlawful interference (15 April 2013) at 15.  
35   Plant, above n 27, at 99. 
36  Cabinet Business Committee, above n 25, at [3] and [20].   
37   Cabinet Legislation Committee “Protection of offshore petroleum and mineral activity from 
unlawful interference – Supplementary Order Paper to Crown Minerals (Permitting and Crown 
Land) Bill” (18 March 2013) at [10] (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment).  
38   “SOP – 205 Protection from Interference” at 1 (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 
Request to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment); Regulatory Impact Statement, 
above n 34, at [12].  
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owned minerals for the benefit of New Zealand.” The new offences align with that 
purpose by providing “permit holders with assurance that they will be able to undertake 
lawful activities.”39 Cabinet considered that such assurance was a necessary part of 
“establishing a predictable investment climate without avoidable risks.”40 These risks 
were the costs discussed above: to companies, the environment and the safety of 
protestors and workers. In order to achieve this assurance, Cabinet introduced the 
offences to provide an “effective and clear deterrent” and “readily workable operation 
powers” in order to prohibit “unlawful interference with legitimate exploration and 
production activities in [the] EEZ from individuals and from vessels, whether New 
Zealand or foreign-flagged.”41  
III The Crown Minerals Amendment Act 2013 
The factors canvassed above motivated the Hon Simon Bridges to introduce 
Supplementary Order Paper 205 to the Committee of the Whole House during their 
consideration of the Crown Minerals (Permitting and Crown Land) Bill.42 The 
Supplementary Order Paper inserted cl 46A, which later became s 55A of the 
Amendment Act. Section 55A inserted ss 101A, 101B and 101C into the Crown Minerals 
Act 1991. These sections create two classes of criminal conduct, prescribe penalties for 
such conduct, and confer enforcement powers in respect of the offences. The detail of the 
two classes of criminal conduct will now be set out in order to ground the analysis of 
jurisdiction under international law and consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act.      
A Intentional Damage or Interference with Structures or Operations 
Section 101B(1) criminalises intentional conduct by any person that results in: 
(a) damage to, or interference with, any structure or ship that is in an offshore 
area and that is, or is to be, used in mining operations or for the processing, 
storing, preparing for transporting, or transporting of minerals; or 
(b) damage to, or interference with, any equipment on, or attached to, such a 
structure or ship; or 
  
39   “SOP – 205 Protection from Interference”, above n 38, at 1.  
40   Cabinet Business Committee, above n 25, at [3]. 
41   Cabinet Business Committee, above n 25, at [24]; Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 34, at [30].  
42  Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (205) Crown Minerals (Permitting and Crown Land) Bill (70–2). 
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(c) interference with any operations or activities being carried out, or any works 
being executed, on, by means of, or in connection with such a structure or 
ship. 
The offence requires that the accused person intended their conduct; they need not have 
intended the consequences of their conduct. Yet, it is the consequences of their conduct 
that determines whether the offence is committed. Thus, the offence is committed if the 
conduct results in “damage or interference”. The legislation does not define these terms. 
The damage or interference must be to a structure or ship “used in mining operations or 
for the processing, storing, preparing for transporting, or transporting of minerals.” This 
is very broad. “Mining operations” is defined to mean, among other things, “operations in 
connection with mining, exploring, or prospecting for any Crown owned mineral”.43 
There is a further requirement that the ship or structure is in an “offshore area”. When the 
Amendment Bill was proposed, “offshore area” was defined to mean “any area within the 
territorial sea or EEZ that is on or above the continental shelf.”44 In effect, this definition 
limited the application of these offences to the territorial sea and the EEZ. However, this 
definition was amended by s 14 of the Crown Minerals Amendment Act Amendment Act 
2013 before the original Amendment Act came into force. “Offshore area” now means 
any area that is:45  
(a) within the territorial sea; or 
(b) within the EEZ; or 
(c) on or above the continental shelf. 
By replacing the words “that is” with the word “or” this amendment extends the 
application of the offences to the area of the sea beyond the EEZ but above the 
continental shelf, an additional 1.7 million square kilometres.46   
The penalty for offending against s 101B(1) is significant. In the case of an individual, 
the maximum penalty is “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months” or “a fine 
not exceeding $50,000.” In the case of a body corporate, such as Greenpeace, the 
maximum penalty is “a fine not exceeding $100,000”.47  
  
43  Crown Minerals Act, s 2(1).  
44   Crown Minerals Amendment Bill 2012 (70-3A), cl 46A. 
45   Crown Minerals Act, s 101A.   
46   Clark, above n 12.     
47  Section 101B(4). 
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B Entry into a Specified Non-interference Zone 
The second class of conduct criminalised under the Amendment Act is that of entering 
into a specified non-interference zone. Thus, s 101B(2) stipulates that a person commits 
an offence if: 
(a) the person is the master of a ship that, without reasonable excuse, enters a 
specified non-interference zone for a permitted prospecting, exploration, or 
mining activity; or 
(b) the person leaves a ship and, without reasonable excuse, enters a specified 
non-interference zone for a permitted prospecting, exploration, or mining 
activity. 
In contrast to the offences under s 101B(1), this is a strict liability offence.48 It is not 
necessary that the offender intends to enter into the specified non-interference zone, 
provided that they do enter without a reasonable excuse.  
The Chief Executive of MBIE may specify a non-interference zone by notice published in 
the fortnightly edition of the New Zealand Notices to Mariners.49 The New Zealand 
Notices to Mariners is a globally recognised circular that informs “mariners of important 
matters affecting navigational safety” and is “the authority for correcting nautical 
charts.”50 The published notice must specify:51  
(a) the permitted prospecting, mining, or exploration activity to which the non-
interference zone relates; and 
(b) the locality of the activity; and 
(c) the area of the non-interference zone to which the activity relates (which 
may be up to 500 metres from any point on the outer edge of the structure or 
ship to which the activity relates or, if there is any equipment attached to the 
structure or ship, 500 metres from any point on the outer edge of the 
equipment); and 
(d) the period (which may be up to 3 months) for which the notice has effect. 
Paragraph (c) provides that the maximum radius of the non-interference zone is 500 
metres. In determining the radius, the Chief Executive must “take into account the nature 
  
48   Supplementary Order Paper, above n 42, (explanatory note).  
49   Section 101B(6). 
50   Land Information New Zealand “Notices to Mariners” <www.linz.co.nz>; International Maritime 
Organisation Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation Around Offshore Installations and Structures 
A/Res/671/16 (1989) at 289. 
51  Crown Minerals Act, s 101B(7). 
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of the activity, including the size of any structure or ship to which the activity relates and 
any equipment attached to the structure or ship necessary for the carrying out of the 
activity.”52 
There are three important parallels between s 101B(1) and 101B(2). First, both provisions 
can be applied to protect either a ship or a structure. Second, both offences apply to 
conduct in an “offshore area” as defined above.53 Third, both provisions apply in relation 
to permitted prospecting, exploration or mining activities. However, a person who 
commits an offence against subs 101B(2) is liable on summary conviction to a lesser fine 
“not exceeding $10,000.”54 
To date, notice of one specified non-interference zone has been given. It applies to the:55 
a)  anchoring of the semi-submersible rig, the Kan Tan IV, to the seabed; 
b)  drilling and well testing operations undertaken by Kan Tan IV; and 
c)  the recovery of the anchors, on completion of the activities in (b). 
These activities are to occur within an area 1.6 by 1.8 nautical miles (2.96 by 3.33 
kilometres) within the EEZ off the Taranaki coast. The radius of the non-interference 
zone was set at 500 metres from the outer edge of the Khan Tan IV, a semi-submersible 
drilling rig, or any ship or equipment involved with the activities set out above. The 
Notice to Mariners identifies that two ships, the Skandi Pacific and the Skandi Emerald, 
will support the Khan Tan IV.56 
C Enforcement Measures 
The offences set out in s 101B may be enforced by every constable and every person 
acting under the command of, or commanding, a ship of the New Zealand Defence 
Force.57 The powers accorded to enforcement officers are broad. Every enforcement 
  
52  Section 101B(8). 
53   Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “16A: Non Interference Zones Around Petroleum 
and Mineral Exploration and Production Activities” in Annual New Zealand Notices to Mariners – 
New Zealand Nautical Almanac (2013–2014) at 256. 
54  Crown Minerals Act, s 101B(5). 
55   Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “NZ 179T/13” ed 17 New Zealand Notices to 
Mariners (16 August 2013) Land Information New Zealand <www.linz.govt.nz> at 13. 
56   At 13. For vessel details see Marine Traffic “Kan Tan IV” (9 September 2013) 
<www.marinetraffic.com>; Marine Traffic “Skandi Pacific” (9 September 2013) 
<www.marinetraffic.com>; Marine Traffic “Skandi Emerald” (9 September 2013) 
<www.marinetraffic.com>. 
57  Section 101C(6).  
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officer who has reasonable cause to suspect a person has, is, or is attempting to commit 
an offence against 101B, may:58 
(a) stop a ship within a specified non-interference zone and detain the ship: 
(b) remove any person or ship from a specified non-interference zone: 
(c) prevent any person or ship from entering a specified non-interference zone:  
(d) board a ship (whether within a specified non-interference zone or otherwise), 
give directions to the person appearing to be in charge, and require the person 
to give his or her name and address: 
(e) without warrant, arrest a person. 
There is, however, a restriction placed upon enforcement in respect of foreign ships. In 
accordance with subs 101B(9): 
No proceedings for an offence against this section may be brought in a New 
Zealand court in respect of a contravention of this section on board, or by a person 
leaving, a foreign ship without the consent of the Attorney-General. 
IV Does the Amendment Act Exceed New Zealand’s Jurisdictional 
Competence at International Law? 
Part IV will now advance the proposition that the offences in the Amendment Act are 
within New Zealand’s jurisdictional competence. This issue arises because the 
Amendment Act expressly purports to apply to foreign vessels, and to “offshore areas” 
outside of New Zealand’s territory. There is no question that the offences are consistent 
with New Zealand’s jurisdiction as a matter of national law. By virtue of s 15(1) of the 
Constitution Act 1986, Parliament has “full power to make laws,” including those with 
extraterritorial effect.59 Although legislation is presumed to not apply extraterritorially,60 
the Amendment Act overcomes this by virtue of the definition of “offshore area” in s 
101A. In order to argue that the Amendment Act is also consistent with New Zealand’s 
jurisdiction under international law, this paper will now introduce the concept of 
jurisdiction at international law.  
  
58   Section 101C(1).  
59  Laws of New Zealand Human Rights (online ed) at [39].    
60   Poynter v Commerce Commission [2010] NZSC 38; [2010] 3 NZLR 300 at [36]. 
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A Jurisdiction at International Law 
Jurisdiction is an aspect of state sovereignty. It can be understood as “the power of the 
state under international law to regulate or otherwise impact upon people.”61 International 
law determines the permissible extent of state jurisdiction.62 A distinction is drawn 
between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Prescriptive jurisdiction relates to the 
capacity to make law whereas enforcement jurisdiction relates to the capacity to ensure 
compliance with that law, either via executive or judicial action.63 Enforcement 
jurisdiction does not necessarily correspond with prescriptive jurisdiction.64 
The question of state jurisdiction under international law came before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in S S Lotus. With respect to enforcement jurisdiction, the 
Court ruled:65 
the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – 
failing the exercise of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its 
power in any form in the territory of another state. In this sense jurisdiction is 
certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by 
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. 
In this statement the Court confirms the territorial principle of jurisdiction: that 
international law accords both enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction to states within 
their territory.66 The Court also endorses the corollary of this principle: in the absence of 
a permissive rule of international law, a state does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Although the Court’s statement related to enforcement jurisdiction, state practice 
confirms that a state asserting novel extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction must prove 
that it is entitled to do so.67 Thus, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction also depends 
upon some specific basis in international law.68 The extraterritorial limitation upon 
  
61  Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 645; 
James Crawford Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) at 456.   
62  Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts Oppenheim’s International Law (9th ed, Longman, London, 
1992) vol 1 at 456. 
63  Shaw, above n 61, at 645–646; Crawford, above n 61, at 456. 
64  Alan V Lowe and Christopher Staker “Jurisdiction” in Malcolm D Evans International Law (3rd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 313 at 332. 
65  S S Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (series A) No 10 at [45]. 
66  Crawford, above n 61, at 458–459. 
67  Lowe and Staker, above n 64, at 319–320. 
68  Crawford, above n 61, at 458. 
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jurisdiction is conveyed by the Court in two slightly different terms. The first prohibits 
the exercise of jurisdiction in another state’s territory. The second prohibits the exercise 
of jurisdiction outside of a state’s own territory. Although these propositions reflect the 
same principle, they differ as there are areas outside the territory of a state that do not fall 
within the territory of another state.69 It is these very areas, governed by the law of the 
sea, with which this paper is concerned.  
The following analysis will be structured to reflect the centrality of the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction. This paper will first establish that, to the extent the offences 
apply over the territorial sea, they are within New Zealand’s jurisdiction. It will then 
argue that the prescription and enforcement of the offences beyond the territorial sea also 
falls within New Zealand’s jurisdiction at international law.     
B New Zealand’s Jurisdiction within the Territorial Sea 
The territorial principle of jurisdiction provides that a sovereign state is entitled to 
complete prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction within its territory.70 A state’s 
territory is the defined portion of the globe subject to that state’s sovereignty.71 Article 2 
of UNCLOS confirms that coastal state sovereignty extends beyond its land territory to 
the territorial sea.72 Thus, New Zealand has both prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction over all vessels within its territorial sea. This includes both New Zealand and 
foreign vessels. However, this jurisdiction is qualified by the provisions in UNCLOS 
relating to the territorial sea.73 This qualification does not undermine New Zealand’s 
absolute prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in the territorial sea over New Zealand 
vessels. The effect of this qualification is that New Zealand’s jurisdiction over foreign 
vessels is subject to the provisions within UNCLOS concerning the right of innocent 
passage.74  
Article 17 of UNCLOS provides that “ships of all States … enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea.” A vessel is considered to be in passage if its 
  
69  Lowe and Staker, above n 64, at 335. 
70  Antonio Cassese International Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at 49.    
71  Jennings and Watts, above n 62, at 563; Shaw, above n 61, at 489. 
72  UNCLOS, art 2(1); Daniel P O’Connell The International Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1982) vol 1 at 60–67; John H Currie, Craig Forcese and Valerie Oosterveld International Law: 
Doctrine, Practice and Theory (Irwin Law, Ontario, 2007) at 364; Shaw, above n 61, at 570. 
73  UNCLOS, art 2(3); Crawford, above n 61, at 256. 
74  Thomas Dux Specially Protected Marine Areas in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ ) (Lit Verlag, 
Berlin, 2011) at 124, n 825; Crawford, above n 61, at 256. 
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navigation through the territorial sea is “continuous and expeditious.”75 Foreign protest 
vessels engaged in non-violent human shield direct action protest tactics are not in 
“passage” as their navigation through the territorial sea is neither continuous nor 
expeditious. Moreover, interference with any installation of the coastal state is deemed to 
be “prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal State” and, therefore, 
to be non-innocent.76 Thus their passage would not be innocent if the subject of the direct 
action protest was a structure or installation. Due to its sovereignty over the territorial sea 
New Zealand has unqualified prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over vessels not 
exercising their right to innocent passage.77 The right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction 
over foreign vessels in these circumstances is expressly recognised by art 25 of UNCLOS 
which permits coastal states to take “necessary steps” to “prevent passage which is not 
innocent.”78 
Not all foreign vessels potentially affected by the Amendment Act will be conducting 
non-violent direct action protest. Foreign vessels conducting purely communicative 
protests may be in continuous and expeditious navigation and may thereby be exercising 
their right of innocent passage. Additionally, foreign vessels that are not protesting, but 
that nevertheless enter into the specified non-interference zones, would be exercising 
their right to innocent passage. New Zealand is not entitled to hamper innocent passage 
“except in accordance with [the] Convention”.79 Relevantly, UNCLOS permits a coastal 
state to adopt, and requires foreign vessels to adhere to laws and regulations relating to:80 
(a)  the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;  
(b)  the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or 
installations. 
This provision confers upon New Zealand prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over 
innocent passage in the subject matters of navigational safety and the protection of 
facilities or installations. Although the primary objective of the offences in the 
Amendment Act is to deter interference with prospecting, exploration and mining 
activity, both offences do relate to the safety of navigation and the protection of structures 
and installations. Therefore, to the extent the offences hamper innocent passage, they do 
  
75  Article 18(2). A vessel in passage may only stop for limited purposes, none of which are relevant to 
direct action protest.  
76  Articles 19(1) and 19(2)(k).         
77  See Churchill and Lowe, above n 6, at 75 and 86. 
78  Article 25(1).        
79  Article 24(1).     
80  Article 21.  
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so in accordance with UNCLOS. It follows that the prescription and enforcement of those 
provisions with respect to foreign vessels in the territorial sea is within New Zealand’s 
jurisdictional competence under international law.  
C New Zealand’s Jurisdiction beyond the Territorial Sea 
As discussed, the exercise of prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction over conduct 
occurring beyond the territorial sea will only comply with international law if it is based 
upon a permissive rule of international law. With respect to New Zealand vessels, the 
relevant permissive rule is the principle of nationality. With respect to foreign vessels, the 
permissive rules are to be found in the legal regime created by UNCLOS.  
1 New Zealand Vessels and the Principle of Nationality 
The nationality principle of jurisdiction provides that a state can exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction over nationals of that state, regardless of where they are.81 This is relevant 
because, by virtue of art 91(1) of UNCLOS, “ships have the nationality of the State 
whose flag they are entitled to fly.” Consequently, New Zealand is entitled to extend the 
application of the Amendment Act to New Zealand vessels both within and beyond the 
territorial sea. New Zealand vessels are also subject to New Zealand’s enforcement 
jurisdiction whilst on the high seas or within New Zealand’s territorial sea or EEZ.82  
2 Foreign Vessels and UNCLOS 
The position with respect to foreign vessels beyond the territorial sea requires deeper 
analysis. This paper will argue that UNCLOS grants New Zealand the requisite 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction under international law. However, before 
addressing the particular machinery of UNCLOS, it is important to understand that 
UNCLOS itself is the result of an extended nine year negotiation which proceeded by 
consensus.83 Consequently, the provisions adopted strike a careful compromise between 
competing interests in an extremely sophisticated manner.84 The two competing interests 
that give rise to the controversy surrounding the offences in the Amendment Act are the 
same two interests that have shaped the historical development of the law of the sea. This 
tension between the freedom of the high seas and coastal state control of the seas adjacent 
  
81  Crawford, above n 61, at 460; Lowe and Staker, above n 64, at 323. 
82  See Evans, above n 5, at 665; Shaw, above n 61, at 673; UNCLOS, art 92(1).  
83  See Barry Buzan “Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea” (1981) 75 AJIL 324.  
84  Evans, above n 5, at 659. 
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to their coasts has led to defining moments such as the publication of Hugo Grotius’ 
Mare Liberum and the Truman Proclamations of jurisdiction and control over the natural 
resources in the seabed of the continental shelf.85 As naval forces posed ever graver 
security threats and technology developed to enable the exploitation of ocean resources, 
coastal states sought to protect and advance their interests by claiming an extended right 
to control the waters adjacent to their coast. Such claims were strongly resisted by 
maritime powers intent upon protecting the freedom of the seas.86 Bearing in mind the 
fine balance struck by UNCLOS, this paper will now proceed to argue that the 
Amendment Act is a reasonable exercise of coastal state rights in the exploitation of 
resources on the continental shelf.  
(a) New Zealand’s Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels  
The legal regime of the continental shelf, set out in Part VI of UNCLOS, mediates 
between coastal state sovereign rights in the exploitation of natural resources on the 
continental shelf and the freedom of the seas. This regime must guide the present analysis 
even though the offences in the Amendment Act purport to apply both within the EEZ 
and in the waters above the continental shelf beyond the EEZ. This is because art 56(3) of 
UNCLOS provides that coastal state rights with respect to the seabed in the EEZ, as set 
out in art 56, are to be exercised in accordance with the legal regime governing the 
continental shelf.  
Article 56(1)(a) provides that, within the EEZ, coastal states have “sovereign rights for 
the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent87 to the seabed and of the seabed 
and its subsoil.” Similarly, art 77(1) in Part VI confirms that the coastal state exercises 
“over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting 
its natural minerals”. The concept of sovereign rights conveys a more limited form of 
authority than absolute sovereignty.88 Yet the drafting history of UNCLOS indicates it 
was not intended that the nature of the coastal state’s power be compromised, but that the 
  
85  Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2010) at 3; Hugo Grotius The Freedom of the Seas or the Right which Belongs to the Dutch to Take 
Part in the East Indian Trade (Oxford University Press,  New York, 1633 trans, 1916 rep);  Policy 
of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil of the Sea Bed and the 
Contintental Shelf, as reproduced in Alan V Lowe and S Talmon (eds) The Legal Order of the 
Oceans: Basic Documents on the Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) at 19.    
86   Rothwell and Stephens, above n 85, at 3–14.       
87  The superjacent waters are those waters above the seabed of the continental shelf.  
88  Maria Gavouneli Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden, 2007) at 64.      
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legal separation between the continental shelf and the superjacent waters be 
emphasised.89 The effect of arts 56 and 77 is that, with respect to the specific purpose of 
exploring and exploiting the natural resources in the seabed of the continental shelf, New 
Zealand is sovereign. UNCLOS also accords particular jurisdiction to coastal states over 
structures engaged in the exploitation of resources in the EEZ by virtue of arts 56 and 
60.90 The provisions in art 60 are imported mutatis mutandis91 to artificial islands, 
installations and structures on the continental shelf.92 The jurisdiction conferred includes 
jurisdiction with regard to “customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and 
regulations.”93 Discussion during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea indicated that jurisdiction was intended to “include criminal jurisdiction with regards 
to offences committed on or against such installations and structures.”94  
As the Amendment Act offences serve the purpose of protecting and enhancing the 
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in the continental shelf, they are, 
prima facie, within New Zealand’s prescriptive jurisdiction under international law. To 
the extent that the offences protect installations and structures, as opposed to ships, the 
prescriptive jurisdiction is also expressly conferred by art 60.95 However, the jurisdiction 
conferred upon coastal states is not absolute and is subject, in particular, to two 
restrictions. Coastal states must, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, have due regard to 
the freedom of navigation. Moreover, the exercise of their jurisdiction may not 
unjustifiably interfere with freedom of navigation. This paper will now proceed to argue 
that the Amendment Act is consistent with these qualifications. This is critical because if 
the Amendment Act contravenes these restrictions then it exceeds the jurisdiction 
permitted to New Zealand under international law.   
  
89  O’Connell, above n 72, at 477. 
90  Article 56(1)(b)(i) and 60(1)(b). 
91  Mutatis mutandis means “with the necessary changes”. There are no relevant changes in relation to 
the tension between art 60 and the freedom of navigation because that freedom applies within the 
EEZ as well as in the high seas above the outer continental shelf. See Bryan A Garner (ed) Black’s 
Law Dictionary (9th ed, Thomson Reuters, United States of America, 2009) at 1115.  
92  Article 80. 
93  Article 60(3).     
94  Myron H Nordquist United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 1985) vol 2 at [60.15(d)].   
95  Article 60 concerns structures but not ships: the reference in art 60(3) to the “construction of 
installations and structures” suggests something permanent and at least semi-fixed, as opposed to 
mobile. This understanding is supported by state practice. See Oceans Act 1996 SC 1996 c 31, s 
20(1); International Maritime Organisation, above n 50, at 288; Tullio Treves “Italy and the Law of 
the Sea” in Tullio Treves and Laura Pineschi (eds) The Law of the Sea: The European Union and its 
Member States (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997) 327 at 341. 
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First, the obligation on coastal states to “have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States” will be discussed.96 The right at issue is the freedom of navigation, as this right is 
exercised by protestors at sea and restricted by non-interference zones specified under the 
Amendment Act. By virtue of arts 58(1) and 87(1), all states have freedom of navigation 
within the EEZ and in the waters over the outer continental shelf. Yet vessels exercising 
their freedom of navigation must also pay due regard to coastal states’ rights over the 
continental shelf.97 Such vessels must “comply with all laws and regulations adopted by 
the coastal State in accordance with” UNCLOS “in so far as they are not incompatible 
with this Part.”98 In this sense, freedom of navigation is not to be given a rigid 
construction nor considered “impervious to reasonable requirements of economic life and 
scientific progress”.99 
The standard of “due regard” is not clarified within UNCLOS, however, the drafting 
history of the due regard obligation in art 87(2) is informative. Article 87(2) was 
preceded by art 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. This provision referred to an 
obligation of “reasonable regard”.100 The adoption of the term “due” in place of 
“reasonable” was merely semantic and not intended to change the legal substance of the 
obligation.101 The principle of “reasonable regard” was applied by the International Court 
of Justice in Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland). The Court held that the 
parties were under mutual obligations to negotiate in good faith towards an equitable 
solution of their differences, and during that process pay due regard to the interests of 
other states.”102 Iceland’s unilateral action disregarded the fishing rights of the United 
Kingdom, and thus breached the principle. Reasonable regard was considered “an 
element of the principle of good faith: rights must be exercised reasonably”.103  
  
96  UNCLOS, art 56(2). 
97  Churchill and Lowe, above n 6, at 206, n 3; O’Connell, above n 72, at 504; UNCLOS, art 87(2).  
98  Article 58(3).       
99  Hersch Lauterpacht “Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas” (1950) 27 BYIL 376 at 403. 
100  Convention on the High Seas 450 UNTS 82 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 
30 September 1962), art 2. 
101  David Anderson Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2008) at 234; Bernard H Oxman “An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Formulated in 
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text” in Thomas A Clingan (ed) Law of the Sea: State Practice 
in Zones of Special Jurisdiction – Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Law of 
the Sea Institute 1979 (The Law of the Sea Institute, Hawaii, 1982) 57 at 70; Edward D Brown “The 
exclusive economic zone: criteria and machinery for the resolution of international conflicts between 
different users of the EEZ” (1977) 4 Marit Pol Mgmt 325 at 339. 
102  Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 3 at 23–24 and 34. 
103  Anderson, above n 101, at 234–235.      
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The standard underlying the reciprocal due regard obligation is therefore one of 
reasonableness. The exercise of coastal state jurisdiction must be consistent with the 
reasonable use of the high seas freedoms.104 The standard of reasonableness is also 
central to the second limitation upon a coastal state’s rights over the resources in the 
continental shelf. Article 78(2) stipulates that the exercise of a coastal state’s sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf for the purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural 
resources must not result in “unjustifiable interference with navigation”.  
An analysis of the compliance of the Amendment Act with these two restrictions may be 
informed by reference to the considerable safeguards for navigation established in the 
context of coastal state jurisdiction under art 60.105 These safeguards are “specific 
elaborations of the due regard obligation of the coastal state”.106 Violations of these 
provisions would unjustifiably interfere with the freedom of navigation.107 Article 60(4) 
provides that coastal states may establish reasonable safety zones around structures and 
installations. The safety zones shall be reasonably related to the nature and function of the 
structures and installations and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them.108 
Moreover, installations and structures and safety zones “may not be established where 
interference may be caused to the use of recognised sea lanes essential to international 
navigation”.109  
Insofar as the Amendment Act protects offshore structures and installations, it aligns with 
the safeguards in art 60. In determining the area of a non-interference zone the Chief 
Executive of MBIE must take into account the nature of the activity to which it will 
apply.110 The maximum area of these zones corresponds to the maximum area 
permissible under UNCLOS. Moreover, the legislative provisions require due notification 
of the safety zones established and specification of the locality of the activity in the New 
Zealand Notices to Mariners, which would be accessible to foreign vessels. Taken 
together with the mental element of the offence of interference, and the defence of 
reasonable excuse to a charge under subs 101B(2), this illustrates that due regard has 
been given to navigation rights in the prescription of these offences. Moreover, as the 
measures accord with the jurisdiction conferred under art 60, the “resulting infringement 
  
104  Jennings and Watts, above n 62, 802–803. 
105  See Brown, above n 101, at 334. 
106  Oxman, above n 101, at 75. 
107  At 75. 
108  UNCLOS, art 60(5).    
109  Article 60(7).  
110  Crown Minerals Act, s 101B(8).  
  
 
23 
 
upon freedom of navigation may be considered justified.”111 Therefore the offences, at 
least insofar as they protect structures and installations, are within New Zealand’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction.   
This paper will now proceed to argue that criminalising conduct carried out against, or in 
the specified non-interference zone surrounding ships, as compared with structures and 
installations, also has due regard for, and does not unjustifiably interfere with, freedom of 
navigation. This argument will be framed by the guidance provided by Joanna Mossop on 
the various factors to be considered when balancing coastal state rights over the outer 
continental shelf with the rights of the users of the superjacent waters.112 Two of the 
factors identified by Mossop are of particular relevance in these circumstances. The first 
is the relative importance of the interests affected. The second is the question of whether 
the interference with freedom of navigation is as minimal as possible in order to achieve 
the coastal state’s objectives.113 Another important factor, to be subsumed within 
Mossop’s first proposed inquiry, is the extent of the interference with the right and the 
corresponding interest. As recommended, guidelines from relevant international 
organisation, the International Maritime Organisation, will also be taken into account.114  
1. Relative importance of the interests affected and the extent of the intrusion on 
the rights 
This factor reflects the opinion of the International Law Commission that the question of 
whether any particular interference is justified is “one of assessment of the relative 
importance of the interests involved.”115 Churchill and Lowe also argue that the due 
regard obligation necessitates a case by case weighing of the competing interests in all 
  
111  Rüdiger Wolfrum “Freedom of Navigation: New Challenges” in Myron H Nordquist, Tommy TB 
Koh and John N Moore (eds) Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009) 79 at 85.  
112  Joanna Mossop “Regulating the Uses of Marine Biodiversity on the Outer Continental Shelf” in 
David Vidas (ed) Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil 
Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2010) 319 
at 327. 
113   At 328.  
114  At 328. 
115  Arthur Watts (ed) The International Law Commission 1949–1998: Volume 1 – The Treaties (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 104.   
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the circumstances.116 David Attard agrees that the interests of states must be 
considered.117  
It will be recalled that the tension that underlies the offences is the conflict between the 
coastal state’s interests in the exploration and exploitation of the resources in the 
continental shelf, and protestors’ freedom of navigation. Freedom of navigation is a 
sacrosanct principle of critical importance within the law of the sea. As noted by the 
Court of Appeal in Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, it is “one of the longest and best 
established principles in international law.”118 Yet a coastal state’s interest in the 
exploitation and exploration of the resources on the seabed of the continental shelf has 
also been a critical driving force behind the evolution of the law of the sea. The growing 
importance and accessibility of offshore resources ultimately led to the phenomenon of 
the EEZ and caused significant disagreement during UNCLOS negotiations.119 At the 
level of principle, neither of these conflicting interests can be said to be relatively more 
important than the other as they are both fundamental and inform the delicate balance 
achieved by UNCLOS.  
In this case however, a discussion of the extent of the intrusion into the respective 
interests is informative. Attard recognised the value of an analysis of the nature of the 
particular interference caused to navigation.120 The Amendment Act only restricts 
navigation within a maximum distance of 500 metres around specified structures or ships. 
Provided the requisite due notice is given as to the existence and location of the specified 
non-interference zones, vessels can alter course and avoid the zones without significant 
financial cost.121 There would be a significant non-financial cost imposed upon foreign 
protest vessels as they would be prevented from achieving the objective of their 
navigation. However, as the navigation of protest vessels does not align with the 
economic and security concerns that have driven the development of the principle of 
freedom of navigation throughout history, the deleterious impact of the spatial restriction 
on freedom of navigation ought not to be overemphasised.122 Thus, a moderate 
interference must be balanced against the significant costs of direct action protest for 
  
116  Churchill and Lowe, above n 6, at 207. 
117   David Attard The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987) 
at 144. 
118  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector [1999] 2 NZLR 44 (CA) at 46. 
119  Attard, above n 117, at 1–30. 
120   At 144. 
121  See Attard, above n 117, at 144.    
122  See Philipp Wendel State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
International Law (Springer, Berlin, 2007) at 6. 
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prospecting, exploration and mining activities. Moreover, the freedom of navigation of 
the prospecting and exploration vessels could be impaired by protest action within the 
specified non-interference zone. Another factor in the balancing exercise is the sovereign 
nature of New Zealand’s rights in relation to resource exploitation. Edward D Brown has 
argued that these rights “raise strong presumptions in favour of priority being accorded to 
the rights of the coastal state” when they conflict with freedom of navigation.123 On 
balance, and in light of these considerations, this factor supports prioritising New 
Zealand’s interest in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the continental 
shelf over the moderate infringement caused to freedom of navigation.  
2. Minimal Impairment  
The second relevant factor can be labelled “minimal impairment”. As proposed by 
Mossop, the question is whether the proposed interference with navigation rights is as 
minimal as possible in order to achieve the coastal state’s objectives, or whether a less 
restrictive option is available to the coastal state.124 This question ought to be applied in a 
more nuanced way that does not focus on extremes but incorporates a standard of 
reasonableness. This approach is appropriate as the standard of reasonableness, illustrated 
in the reciprocal obligations of due regard, pervades the delicate balance struck between 
competing interests by UNCLOS. Moreover, it is supported by the reference in art 79(2) 
to the right of coastal states to “take reasonable measures for the exploration of the 
continental shelf.” The reformulated question would ask whether the measures impose 
more than a reasonably necessary infringement upon freedom of navigation. 
In order to deter direct protest action against offshore prospecting, exploration and 
mining activities it was necessary for Parliament to criminalise both actual interference 
with the relevant ships and structures and the entry into specified non-interference zones. 
In contrast, it was not strictly necessary to set the maximum radius of non-interference 
zones at 500 metres. This is because the preventative effect of criminalising entry into a 
specified non-interference is achieved by the fact of a non-interference zone, and does not 
depend upon the particular maximum radius of that zone. However, setting the maximum 
radius at 500 metres is reasonable as it conforms to the maximum radius permitted by art 
60 for safety zones around structures and installations on the continental shelf.125 The 
International Maritime Organisation has confirmed that protestors must respect safety 
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124   Mossop, above n 112, at 328.  
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zones not exceeding 500 metres in radius.126 For these reasons, the offences are a 
reasonably necessary impairment upon freedom of navigation.   
This paper therefore concludes that criminalising conduct carried out against, or entry 
into the specified non-interference zone surrounding ships, as compared with structures 
and installations, has due regard for, and does not unjustifiably interfere with, freedom of 
navigation. In light of this conclusion, the Amendment Act is to be understood as 
consistent with the prescriptive jurisdiction accorded to New Zealand by UNCLOS. It 
will be recalled, however, that prescriptive jurisdiction does not necessarily entail 
enforcement jurisdiction.127 Thus, this paper will now argue that UNCLOS also accords 
New Zealand the necessary enforcement jurisdiction to enforce the offences against 
foreign vessels beyond the territorial sea.  
(b) New Zealand’s Enforcement Jurisdiction over Foreign Vessels  
Douglas Guilfoyle has argued that a coastal state “clearly” has enforcement jurisdiction 
in the EEZ with respect to the subject matters over which it has sovereign rights.128 If this 
claim is true, then New Zealand has jurisdiction within the EEZ over measures, such as 
the Amendment Act, undertaken for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the resources 
on the continental shelf. Yet Guilfoyle’s argument is untenable in light of a close reading 
of UNCLOS. It is true that art 73 confers enforcement jurisdiction over the laws adopted 
by a coastal state with respect to the exploration and exploitation of the living resources 
of the EEZ.129 However, this jurisdiction does not expressly extend to non-living 
resources.130 
Nevertheless, there are three reasons why New Zealand does have enforcement 
jurisdiction with respect to the offences in the Amendment Act. First, insofar as the 
Amendment Act protects structures, enforcement jurisdiction is conferred under art 60. 
This provides that the coastal state may exercise control within the safety zones 
established around installations and structures on the continental shelf for the purpose of 
  
126  International Maritime Organisation Assuring Safety During Demonstrations, Protests Or 
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ensuring the safety of both navigation and the installation.131 Second, the right of hot 
pursuit extends to violations of coastal state law committed in the EEZ or “on the 
continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations.”132 Hot 
pursuit is the legitimate pursuit of a foreign vessel following the violation of a coastal 
state’s law by that vessel.133 Its extension cements the case for enforcement jurisdiction 
with respect to structures and installations. Hot pursuit may also be undertaken against a 
foreign ship for violation of other “laws of the coastal state applicable in accordance with 
this Convention to the EEZ or the continental shelf”.134 As argued above, the provisions 
of the Amendment Act relating to vessels are enacted in accordance with the prescriptive 
jurisdiction conferred upon New Zealand by UNCLOS. Therefore, hot pursuit of foreign 
vessels may also be undertaken with respect to the offences committed against vessels. 
Third, the commentary of the International Law Commission on the draft of art 2 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf indicates that coastal state sovereign rights were 
intended to include “all rights necessary for and connected with the exploitation of the 
continental shelf [including] jurisdiction in connexion with the prevention and 
punishment of violations of law.”135 
State practice also supports the argument for enforcement jurisdiction. Both the United 
Kingdom and the United States assert authority under national law to enforce safety zone 
regulations in the waters above the continental shelf.136 A very recent example of the 
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction occurred in Russia. In September 2013 the crew of 
the Artic Sunrise, a Norwegian vessel operated by Greenpeace, protested against oil 
drilling in the Pechora Sea in Russia’s EEZ by scaling an offshore oil rig. They have been 
arrested and detained by Russian authorities.137 Although these examples relate to 
enforcement jurisdiction over structures and installations, they support the more general 
proposition that coastal states have the jurisdiction to enforce measures related to the 
exploration and exploitation of natural non-living resources in the continental shelf.  
  
131  UNCLOS, art 60(2); Mossop, above n 112, at 330.  
132  UNCLOS, art 111(2).  
133  Yoshifumi Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2012) at 163–164. 
134  UNCLOS, art 111(2). 
135  Documents of the eighth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly 
[1956] vol 2, YILC 253 at 297. 
136  Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK), s 2; Navigation and Navigable Waters 33 CFR § 147.5 and 
147.10. See also James Kraska and Paul Pedrozo International Maritime Security Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2013) at 83. 
137  Human Rights Watch “Russia: Drop Piracy Charges Against Greenpeace” (30 September 2013) 
<www.hrw.org>.  
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It ought to be noted that this conclusion is in tension with the principle that ships on the 
high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state.138 Although coastal 
state jurisdiction under UNCLOS is a legitimate caveat upon that exclusive 
jurisdiction,139 Parliament included s 101B(9) in the Amendment Act to ensure 
consistency with international law. Section 101B(9) provides that: 
No proceedings for an offence against this section may be brought in a New 
Zealand court in respect of a contravention of this section on board, or by a person 
leaving, a foreign ship without the consent of the Attorney-General. 
This provision reflects similar requirements in other legislation through which New 
Zealand seeks to exert jurisdiction extraterritorially, or over foreign nationals.140 It is 
intended to ensure that any proceedings brought in relation to foreign ships are consistent 
with international law.141 To ensure such consistency, the consent of the Attorney 
General ought to only be given when the flag state has waived their prioritised 
jurisdiction and granted consent to the Attorney General to bring proceedings.142 Whether 
this occurs in practice remains to be seen. Nevertheless, s 101B(9) strengthens the 
argument advanced above that New Zealand does have enforcement jurisdiction under 
international law to enforce the Amendment Act.  
D Conclusion in respect of Jurisdiction under International Law 
This part of the paper has grappled with the tension between the freedom of navigation of 
foreign vessels and New Zealand’s interests in exploring and exploiting the oil and gas 
resources in the continental shelf. It has argued that the Amendment Act is consistent 
with New Zealand’s prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction at international law. It will 
  
138  UNCLOS, art 92(1).  
139  Evans, above n 5, at 671. Exclusive flag state jurisdiction is also displaced in the event of piracy, as 
defined in art 101 of UNCLOS. However, it is unlikely that even violent direct action protest 
constitutes an act of piracy as it is not committed “for private ends”. See Atsuko Kanehara “So-
Called ‘Eco-Piracy’ and Interventions by NGOs to Protest against Scientific Research Whaling on 
the High Seas: An Evaluation of the Japanese Position” in Clive R Symmons (ed) Selected 
Contemporary Issues in the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011) at 207–213; 
But see Castle John v NV Mabeco [1986] 77 ILR 537 (Belgium, Court of Cassation) and Institute of 
Cetacean Research v Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc 708 F 3d 1099 (9th Cir 2013) at 1101–1102. 
140  See for example Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999, s 6(1); Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 
1994, s 6(1).  
141  Regulatory Impact Statement, above n 34, at [64]. 
142  Evans, above n 5, at 666. It has been argued that reliance on coastal state jurisdiction dispenses with 
the need for flag state authorisation altogether: Guilfoyle, above n 128, at 94.  
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be recalled that this jurisdiction is relatively uncontroversial when asserted with respect 
to New Zealand vessels, and within New Zealand’s territorial sea. Beyond the territorial 
sea, jurisdiction over foreign vessels arises by virtue of UNCLOS. The critical issue is 
whether the offences in the Amendment Act are within the scope of the rights attributed 
to coastal state rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the resources on the 
continental shelf.  As argued above, the offences do fit within the scope of these rights as 
they have due regard to, and do not unjustifiably interfere with, freedom of navigation. 
Enforcement jurisdiction is also permitted by UNCLOS, albeit not expressly. Having 
argued that the Amendment Act is consistent with New Zealand’s jurisdiction under 
international law, this paper will now turn to consider whether the offences are consistent 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
V Is the Amendment Act Consistent With the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act? 
This part will focus on the tension between New Zealand’s interests in resource 
exploitation and the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and 
movement exercised by protesters at sea. In order to do so, it will first justify the 
application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA) to the Amendment Act. It will 
also defend the use of the proportionality inquiry required under s 5 of BORA as the most 
appropriate means of taking into account the fact that these protests occur at sea. The 
paper will then proceed to argue that although the Amendment Act limits the rights of 
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and – to the extent applicable – movement, that 
limitation is justified under s 5 of BORA. Due to space constraints, this paper will focus 
solely on these fundamental rights of protest. Other rights, such as freedom for 
unreasonable search and seizure, may also be implicated by the Amendment Act but will 
not be analysed in this paper.  
A The Offshore Application of BORA  
The offences in the Amendment Act purport to apply both within and beyond the 
territorial sea. It will be recalled that the territorial sea is considered part of New 
Zealand’s territory and therefore, within this area, there is no issue of the extraterritorial 
application of BORA to consider. However, as the offences apply beyond the territorial 
sea, it is important to establish the scope of the extraterritorial application of BORA. The 
extraterritorial application of human rights instruments poses the question of whether the 
rights in those instruments apply notwithstanding that “at the moment of the alleged 
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violation of his or her human rights the individual concerned is not physically located in 
the territory of the state.”143 
New Zealand legislation is presumed to not apply extraterritorially unless it contains an 
express provision to the contrary or such application is a necessary implication.144 The 
application of BORA is determined under s 3, which states that the Act applies only to 
acts done:  
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or 
duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
Section 3 neither asserts nor denies the application of BORA extraterritorially and 
therefore does not rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application.145 However, 
as contended by Ella Watt, the extraterritorial application of BORA is a necessary 
implication of the relationship between BORA and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (the ICCPR).146 The Long Title of BORA confirms that it is an Act 
“to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights”.147 The ICCPR requires each state party to it “to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant.”148 The Human Rights Committee and the International Court of 
Justice agree that the ‘and’ in art 2(1) is disjunctive, and that the ICCPR applies when 
states exercise jurisdiction outside their territory.149 The extraterritorial application of 
BORA is a necessary implication because New Zealand must comply with BORA in its 
  
143   Marko Milanovic Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011) at 7. 
144   Poynter v Commerce Commission, above n 60, at [36]. 
145   Ella Watt “The Extraterritorial Application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990” (LLB 
(Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012) at 13–17. 
146  At 17–19. 
147   New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Long Title (b). 
148   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), art 2(1).  
149   Human Rights Committee General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add 13 (2004) at [10]; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at 179. 
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exercise of jurisdiction extraterritorially to meet its international obligations under the 
ICCPR.150 
1 Law of the Sea and Human Rights 
The sovereign rights and jurisdiction accorded to states under UNCLOS are sufficient to 
meet the requirement for the application of human rights instruments that a state has 
jurisdiction over the relevant matter. For this reason, those jurisdictional rights have 
“consecrate[ed] the applicability of human rights at sea.”151 This position has developed 
most clearly in the jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of art 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR). Article 1 of the ECHR requires that “High 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms” guaranteed by the Convention.152   
An illustrative example can be found in Drieman and Others v Norway which concerned 
a protest conducted by Greenpeace against Norwegian whaling vessels within Norway’s 
EEZ. Greenpeace engaged in non-violent direct action tactics, including navigating 
dinghies in a zigzag across the bow of a whaling vessel at a distance of five to 20 metres. 
The protestors were arrested and detained. They argued that this amounted to a violation 
of their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association guaranteed 
under arts 10 and 11 of the ECHR. In holding that Norway’s obligations under the ECHR 
were engaged, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) referred to the rights of 
the coastal state to regulate the exploitation of living resources in its EEZ and found that 
enforcement activities undertaken on this basis constituted an exercise of jurisdiction for 
the purposes of art 1 of the ECHR.153 The case of Salemink also supports this position. 
Salemink concerned the applicability of European social security schemes to a worker 
employed on a gas drilling platform in the Netherland’s EEZ. The European Court of 
Justice held that the functional sovereign and jurisdictional rights conferred on the coastal 
state by UNCLOS entailed the application of European law with respect to work carried 
  
150   Watt, above n 145, at 18.  
151   Irini Papanicolopulu “International Judges and the Protection of Human Rights at Sea” in Nerina 
Boschiero and others (eds) International Courts and the Development of International Law (T M C 
Asser Press, The Hague, 2013) 535 at 539–540. 
152   Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221 (opened 
for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), art 1 [ECHR]. 
153   Drieman and Others v Norway, above n 33. 
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out on installations over the continental shelf for the purposes of prospecting and 
exploiting natural resources.154  
These decisions support the proposition that legislation and enforcement relating to the 
exercise of New Zealand’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of the ICCPR. Therefore the 
provisions and enforcement of the Amendment Act must comply with BORA. However, 
although BORA has the potential to apply beyond the territorial sea, particular rights are 
limited in their application to New Zealand territory. For instance, the right to freedom of 
movement may only be asserted by offshore protestors within the territorial sea. This 
limitation is expressly stipulated in s 18, which provides that “everyone lawfully in New 
Zealand has the right to freedom of movement and residence in New Zealand”.155 For this 
reason, the right to freedom of movement under s 18 will not form a central focus of the 
following analysis of protest rights at sea.  
B Accommodating the Aquatic Context of Protest at Sea 
The protection of protest rights at sea also raises the question of how the location within 
which the rights are exercised, that is, at sea, relates to the rights analysis required by 
BORA. Although BORA does not distinguish between the protection of protest rights at 
sea and on land, the aquatic context of protest does give rise to particular countervailing 
interests that may justify a limitation on those rights under the s 5 proportionality inquiry. 
The balancing inquiry required by s 5 will now be juxtaposed with the methodology 
developed in the United States in relation to the First Amendment protection of free 
speech. 
1 Free Speech and the Public Forum Doctrine 
In United States rights jurisprudence, the significance of the geographic location of 
speech manifests in the public forum doctrine. This doctrine varies the scope of speech 
rights afforded to the speaker according to the category of forum that the person 
occupies.156 The public forum doctrine was recently employed in the resolution of a 
dispute between Greenpeace and Shell concerning protest action within specified 
restricted zones around vessels engaged in oil exploration.  
  
154   Case C-347/10 A Salemink v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut 
werknemersverzekeringen [2012] ECR 00000 at [32]–[35]. 
155   Watt, above n 145, at 29. 
156  Timothy Zick Speech out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 53.  
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In 2012, the District Court of Alaska granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
Greenpeace USA from coming within a specified distance, ranging between 500 and 
1000 metres, of vessels contracted by Shell for oil exploration.157 At first instance, and on 
appeal, Greenpeace argued that restricting their ship’s navigation in such zones would 
unduly limit their First Amendment right to free speech.158 In support of this submission, 
Greenpeace referred to the Supreme Court’s finding in Schenck v Pro-Choice Network 
that floating “bubble” zones prohibiting protest within 15 feet of patients entering or 
leaving an abortion clinic were unconstitutional.159  
This submission was rejected. The District Court emphasised that the Court in Schenck 
was guided, among other things, by the fact that public sidewalks are a “protypical 
example of a public forum”. The sea was no such forum.160 The Court of Appeal affirmed 
this reasoning, stating:161 
[S]peech is, of course, most protected in such quintessential public fora as the 
public sidewalks surrounding abortion clinics. But the high seas are not a public 
forum, and the lessons of Schenck have little applicability here. 
These decisions affirm the prominence of the public forum doctrine in the regulation of 
protest within the United States. Under this doctrine, expressive liberties are broadest in 
“quintessential” or “traditional” public forums such as public streets, parks and 
sideways.162 The public forum doctrine, and other definitional tools like it, have 
developed in response to the unqualified language of the First Amendment, which 
stipulates that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech”.163 As 
there is no express internal or external qualification on that prohibition, the judiciary has 
developed categorisation methods to restrict the scope of the right.164 
  
157  Shell Offshore Inc v Greenpeace Inc 2012 WL 1931537 (D Alaska) at 852.   
158  Shell Offshore Inc v Greenpeace Inc 709 F 3d 1281 (9th Cir 2013) at 1291; Shell Offshore Inc v 
Greenpeace Inc, above n 157, at 852.  
159  Schenck v Pro-Choice Network 519 US 357 (1997). 
160  Shell Offshore Inc v Greenpeace Inc, above n 157, at 852 citing Schenck v Pro Choice Network, 
above n 159, at 377. 
161  Shell Offshore Inc v Greenpeace Inc, above n 158, at 1291.  
162  Zick, above n 156, at 53.  
163  United States Constitution, Amendment I.  
164  Kathleen M Sullivan and Gerald Gunther First Amendment Law (3rd ed, Foundation Press, New 
York, 2007) at 8–13.  
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2  Categorisation versus Proportionality 
The categorisation of the protest forum gives unique importance to location and can 
foreclose balancing of fundamental principles in certain cases.165 As it is a preliminary 
inquiry, categorisation would likely detract from a proper analysis of the particular value 
of the speech act in the circumstances. The place at which protests occur should not be 
decisive in and of itself. Instead, the importance of place should be understood to reside 
in the relationship between that place and the values served by both the regulation and 
protection of protest rights. It is certainly conceivable that protest in places such as the 
grounds of Parliament advance the democratic and truth rationales of protest rights to a 
greater extent than protest in a residential street.166 However, the public forum doctrine 
does not allow for flexibility in analysis and “distracts attention from the first amendment 
values at stake”.167  
There is no public forum doctrine in New Zealand. Yet the place of protest is 
incorporated into the human rights analysis within the proportionality inquiry mandated 
by s 5 of BORA.168 This inquiry ensures that place is treated as one of the contextual 
features of the particular case.169 As McGrath J stated in Brooker v Police, the question of 
whether a restriction of freedom of expression is justified must depend “on the relevant 
time, place and circumstances”.170 This approach is preferable because place should not 
itself determine the protection accorded to protest rights.171  
C A Prima Facie Limitation upon Protest Rights 
Having justified the application of BORA, and in particular of s 5, to the Amendment 
Act, this paper now argues that the offences set out in s 101B(1) and 101B(2) are a prima 
facie limitation on the right to protest. The right to protest is not expressly confirmed in 
  
165  Sullivan and Gunthner, above n 164, at 12. 
166  The rationales of protecting protest are examined further below.  
167  Daniel A Farber and John E Nowak “The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Context and 
Content in First Amendment Adjudication” (1984) 70 Va L Rev 1219 at 1224.   
168  Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) at [15.8.10].  
169  Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at 290. 
170  Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [133]. 
171  Timothy Zick “Speech and Spatial Tactics” (2006) 84 Tex L Rev 581 at 581. 
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BORA, however, it is protected in the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and 
movement.172  
Freedom of expression is protected by s 14 of BORA, which provides:173  
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
Protest has traditionally been addressed solely within the framework of freedom of 
expression.174 However protest action, particularly at sea, is generally collective in 
nature.175 In this way, freedom of expression is fundamentally linked to the freedom of 
peaceful assembly, guaranteed in s 16 of BORA.176 Additionally, everyone has the right 
to freedom of movement under s 18 of BORA although, as discussed, this right is not 
applicable beyond the territorial sea. Each of these rights is integral to effective protest 
action.177  
It is important to understand the rationales and purposes of the protest rights because 
those rationales illustrate the importance of the rights and inform the determination of the 
nature and extent of any infringement upon them.178 The freedoms of expression, 
peaceful assembly and - to the extent applicable - movement share common rationales in 
the context of protest.179 These rationales are traditionally associated with the protection 
of freedom of expression. They are democracy, truth, and self-fulfillment.180  
The argument from democracy asserts that a pluralistic and democratic society requires 
its members to be free to enter into forceful, rigorous and informed debate with each 
  
172  Butler and Butler, above n 168, at [13.5.1] and [16.4.5]; Brooker v Police, above n 170, at [115]; 
Stanton v Police [2012] NZHC 3223, [2013] NZAR 24 at [15]; John Ip “What a Difference a Bill of 
Rights Makes? The Case of the Right to Protest in New Zealand” (2010) 24 NZULR 239 at 239.  
173  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 14.  
174  Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 
2003) at 348; Ip, above n 172, at 239.   
175  See Morse v Police [2011] NZSC 45, [2012] 2 NZLR 1 at [110] per McGrath J.  
176  Barendt, above n 169, at 273; Butler and Butler, above n 168, at [15.1.1].  
177  Sebastian Bisley “Protests and the Chinese President – An Index of Freedom” (2001) 32 VUWLR 
1027 at 1036.  
178  This is consistent with the purposive interpretation required of BORA rights. See Minister of 
Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) 271 per Richardson J. 
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Standards Authority” in Jeremy Finn and Steven Todd (eds) Law, Liberty and Legislation 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at 320; Butler and Butler, above n 168, at [13.6.2]–[13.6.13]. 
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other.181 The dissemination of political ideas, facilitated by the formation of groups and 
assemblies, will result in an informed citizenry equipped to influence government action 
and participate in the democratic process.182 Political protest directly engages this 
rationale,183 and courts consistently confirm that political expression “lie[s] at the very 
heart of freedom of expression.”184 Protest can be considered political if it conveys a 
message “relevant to the development of public opinion on a whole range of issues which 
an intelligent citizen should think about”.185  
The argument from truth is that unrestricted public debate is critical for the discovery of 
truth.186 Such debate creates a “marketplace of ideas” that will lead to the truth.187 
According to this theory, truthful speech defeats falsity through rational discourse,188 and 
the “best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market”.189  
The argument from self-fulfillment posits that expression and assembly are intrinsically 
valuable. Protest facilitates self-development, self-fulfillment and the formation of 
personal identity.190 This rationale conceives of limitations to speech as an affront to 
human dignity.191 The Human Rights Committee has emphasised that this rationale also 
underlies freedom of movement as “liberty of movement is an indispensable condition for 
the free development of a person.”192  
In light of these rationales, it will now be argued that criminalising non-violent direct 
action protest against ships and structures engaged in prospecting, exploration and mining 
  
181  Butler and Butler, above n 168, at [13.6.11] and [15.1.1]. 
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184  See for example Morse v Police, above n 175, at [108] per McGrath; and Wadsworth v Auckland 
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of resources limits the right to protest. Direct action protest may be violent or non-
violent. Violent direct action protest is not a protected exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression or peaceful assembly. Freedom of expression is “as wide as human thought 
and imagination”,193 yet it does not protect violent conduct.194 Similarly, freedom of 
assembly is internally qualified by the requirement that the assembly be peaceful. In 
Barret v Tipperary, the Court held that an assembly is peaceful unless it is violent in and 
of itself or has a serious and aggressive effect on people or property.195 Violent direct 
action would meet this threshold. However, non-violent direct action and traditional 
communicative protest are both protected by freedom of expression and peaceful 
assembly.  
Non-violent direct action protest fits within the scope of freedom of expression provided 
the conduct has an expressive component.196 Non-violent direct protest against vessels 
and structures engaged in prospecting, exploring or mining has an expressive component 
as it attempts to convey opposition to such activities. Additionally, the passive use of 
human shield tactics in non-violent direct action protest meets the requirement that 
assembly is peaceful. Thus, both traditional communicative protests and non-violent 
direct action fall within the guarantee of peaceful assembly.  
The rationales of protest rights identified earlier also support the inclusion of non-violent 
direct action protest within the scope of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. 
Protest at sea enables the insertion of ideas and opinions regarding prospecting, 
exploration or mining activities into the “marketplace of ideas” within which, the theory 
maintains, truth will be revealed. The argument from self-fulfillment is also triggered if 
participating in such a protest is of value to an individual.197  
The consistency of non-violent direct action with the democratic rational is more 
contentious. David Mead argues that although direct action protests may relate to political 
matters, they “do not seek citizen reflection on state policy” and are therefore not aligned 
with the democratic rationale.198 To the same end, Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson 
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contend that in seeking to bring about change directly, non-violent direct action has an 
anti-democratic aim and therefore subverts rather than strengthens democracy.199 Such 
concerns motivated the Third Section of the ECtHR in Drieman and Others v Norway to 
hold that the non-violent direct action tactics of Greenpeace could not receive “the same 
privileged protection as political speech or peaceful demonstration of opinion on such 
matters.”200  
However, there is a strong argument that non-violent direct action at sea does engage the 
democratic rationale as the protests are political in nature and do disseminate political 
ideas.201 To assert that direct action protestors do not engage with the citizenry is to 
oversimplify both the purpose and the effect of direct action protest. While the immediate 
purpose is to physically impede the activity, the ultimate aim may be to bring about 
change by generating a reflective and informed electorate. This was true of the protest at 
issue in Police v Teddy by which Teddy “attempted to disrupt mining and exploration 
activities with the aim of generating publicity through protest”.202 The decision to engage 
in controversial human shield tactics can be understood as a calculated attempt to 
facilitate the conveyance of a message. In a world driven by a need for immediate 
sensationalism and controlled by media, “controversy tends to attract airtime and 
coverage.”203 The uploading of video recordings of direct action protest at sea onto the 
websites of prominent environment non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace 
supports this understanding.204 Additionally, direct action protests may “play an 
important supporting and catalyzing role within the democratic process.”205 Therefore 
non-violent direct action protest does engage the democratic rationale for the protection 
of protest.  
Moreover, non-violent direct action protest has been held to fall within the scope of 
freedom of expression in Police v Geiringer206 and Steel and Others v United 
Kingdom.207 The protest in Police v Geiringer was the act of lying down in front of a 
vehicle with the intention of preventing that vehicle from moving.208 In Steel and Others 
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v United Kingdom the ECtHR held that two non-violent direct action protests constituted 
expression protected by art 10 of the ECHR. The first protestor attempted to obstruct a 
grouse-shoot by walking in front of one member of the shoot as he lifted his gun. The 
second protestor stood under a digger in an attempt to disrupt building works on a 
motorway extension.209  
Penalising entry into a specified non-interference zone is also a prima facie spatial 
limitation on the guaranteed freedoms.210 Freedom of expression encompasses the right to 
impart information and includes the freedom to choose the place at which the opinion is 
expressed in order that it might have the greatest impact.211 Regulating where protest can 
occur therefore limits freedom of expression.212 As Lamer J said in the Canadian 
Supreme Court, “freedom of expression cannot be exercised in a vacuum … it necessarily 
implies the use of a physical space in order to meet its underlying objectives.”213 
Similarly, freedom of peaceful assembly protects the right to assemble “at a place of 
one’s choosing.”214 The fundamental importance of the “right to protest in an effective 
way” led the Supreme Court to affirm in Morse v Police that it “is legitimate for those 
wishing to protest to make choices based on time, place and circumstance as to the most 
effective manner of doing so.”215 Criminalising entry into specified non-interference 
zones restricts this legitimate choice and is therefore an infringement of the right to 
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The limitation on freedom of movement, 
although only relevant within the territorial sea, is self-evident.  
D A Justified Limitation upon Protest Rights 
Having established the prima facie limitation upon protest rights, this paper will now 
argue that the Amendment Act is nevertheless consistent with BORA as the limitation is 
justified in accordance with s 5. Section 5 provides that: 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
  
209  Steel and Others v United Kingdom, above n 207, at [92]; See also Hashman and Harrup v United 
Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 241 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) and Drieman and Others v Norway, above 
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The methodology developed in New Zealand in applying s 5 has drawn upon the Oakes 
test set out by the Canadian Supreme Court. The following questions are pertinent:216  
(a) Does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom? 
(b) Proportionality: 
(i) Is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii) Does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
(iii) Is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective? 
As these questions are considered, recourse will be made to the concept of deference. 
Deference refers to the degree of latitude accorded to Parliament’s judgment and can 
inform every aspect of the s 5 inquiry.217 Judicial deference to Parliament is appropriate 
in New Zealand because of the reference in s 5 to our “free and democratic society” and 
the consequent need to give “appropriate weight to the fact that a limit has been 
democratically enacted.”218  
The prevalence of deference within proportionality jurisprudence has led to scholarly 
debate concerning the approach that courts should take in affording deference to primary 
decision makers. For instance, Murray Hunt calls for a culture of justification, in which 
decision makers are explicit about the contextual factors that are relevant to the intensity 
of review, and about how those factors influence the “degree of deference appropriate in 
the particular context.”219 It is of critical importance, in Hunt’s view, that the concept of 
deference is distinguished from submission. Deference ought to be understood as 
respectful attention to the justifications offered by the decision maker. In this sense, due 
deference still requires a review of the issue at dispute, yet refrains from reviewing that 
decision for correctness.220  
Tipping J opined that the deference given to Parliament’s appreciation of the matter could 
be primarily determined by the subject matter. Matters involving “major political, social 
or economic decisions” demand significant deference in contrast to matters having 
  
216  Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [103] per Tipping J, [203]–[205] per McGrath J, 
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“substantial legal content”.221 In Hansen, Tipping J reasoned that Parliament was to be 
accorded only a small degree of latitude because the presumption of innocence was “at 
the heart of criminal justice” and was not an area within which “Parliament’s institutional 
competence or expertise might justify substantial judicial restraint”.222 However, the 
subject matter and the relative institutional competence do not exhaust the factors that 
influence the deference due. The importance of the right impinged will also inform this 
decision. Hunt also identifies other relevant factors including the “degree of democratic 
accountability of the primary decision maker, and the extent to which the affected 
interests have already had the opportunity of genuinely participating in a democratic 
process directed at balancing the competing interests.”223  
With respect to the Amendment Act, a moderate degree of deference is due to Parliament. 
Although regular national elections affirm the democratic accountability of Parliament, 
affected interests have not had the opportunity of genuinely participating in a democratic 
process directed at balancing competing interests in this case. It will be recalled that the 
relevant offences were introduced in a Supplementary Order Paper. The amendments 
were therefore not heard by a Select Committee and the opportunity for genuine 
participation in the democratic process was negated.224 Moreover, the Attorney General 
did not vet the Supplementary Order Paper for compliance with BORA, as could 
otherwise have been required under s 7. These factors, taken in light of the fundamental 
nature of the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, argue against 
according deference.225 
However, the relative institutional competence on this matter favours deference. The 
executive, acting through the legislature, has relative expertise in assessing the measures 
necessary to achieve their objectives due to their experience in managing protest activity. 
Moreover, the subject matter of the impugned provisions is the protection of permitted 
prospecting, exploration and mining activities. This falls at the policy, social and 
economic end of Tipping J’s proposed spectrum and it is not a purely legal matter. On 
balance, these concerns justify a moderate degree of latitude towards the legislature’s 
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assessment of the balance to be struck between protest rights and government objectives. 
The s 5 inquiry will be conducted with this degree of deference in mind.  
1 Sufficiently Important Objective  
The first question is whether the limiting measure serves a purpose sufficiently important 
to justify curtailment of the rights and freedoms. In Oakes, Dickson CJ opined that the 
objective “must relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial rather than merely 
trivial”,226 and must be directed to the “realisation of collective goals of fundamental 
importance.”227 Although these observations suggest that a court would engage in a strict 
scrutiny of the legislative objective, the practical experience in Canada demonstrates that 
this requirement is met without difficulty.228 McGrath J’s statement in Hansen that “it 
would be rare in New Zealand for the courts to decide that the objective of the legislature 
in criminalising certain behaviour was in pursuit of a policy goal that was not a legitimate 
aim” supports a similar understanding in the New Zealand context.229 
The primary objective of s 101B, as discussed above, is to deter interference with the 
prospecting, exploration and mining of Crown resources in order to promote investment. 
Subsidiary objectives included ensuring the safety of both protestors and exploration 
vessels, and ensuring the navigation of vessels was not impeded. Failure to achieve these 
objectives would increase the risk faced by investors and thereby undermine the 
promotion of the prospecting, exploring and mining of Crown resources.  
The objectives of securing economic investment, safety and navigation free from 
interference are substantial, not trivial, concerns. The sea is an “unpredictable and 
dangerous environment”230 within which protest action involving the close navigation of 
ships, or ships with structures, raises legitimate safety concerns.231 Freedom of navigation 
is a sacrosanct principle in the law of the sea which has developed to address the need to 
protect the economic interests of states. The objective of attracting foreign investment is 
also of substantial importance as it has flow-on consequences for the economic 
development of New Zealand. These objectives could also be described as collective 
goals of fundamental importance.  
  
226  At 138–139. 
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In light of the required purposive interpretation of BORA,232 it is also appropriate to refer 
to New Zealand’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the ICCPR).233 Articles 19 and 21 of the ICCPR guarantee the freedoms of 
expression and assembly and provide a list of purposes that may legitimately justify 
limitations on those rights. One of these is “the respect of the rights … of others”.234 The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also permits limitations necessary for 
that purpose.235 Jurisprudence under BORA closely follows the grounds provided for in 
the ICCPR and ECHR.236 It is certainly arguable that the provisions of s 101B serve the 
purpose of respecting the rights of others as the term “rights” is not limited to rights 
protected in BORA.237 The rights respected in this instance are the rights of companies 
who have a permit under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 to engage in prospecting, 
exploration or mining activities. These arguments lead to the conclusion that the 
objectives that motivated Supplementary Order Paper 205 were sufficiently important to 
justify some infringement upon freedom of expression and assembly. 
2 Proportionality 
(a) Rational Connection 
The first step of the proportionality inquiry is to determine whether there is a rational 
connection between the offences and the objectives pursued. The Court in Oakes stated 
that the law must be “carefully designed to achieve the objective in question” and should 
not be “arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations”.238 This formulation of the 
test was applied in Hansen by Blanchard J and McGrath J,239 whereas Anderson J 
expressed the view that these qualifications were subsumed within the proportionality 
inquiry and therefore did not require individual consideration.240 Tipping J conceived of 
the “rational connection” test as a threshold question, satisfied by a mere logical 
relationship between the limitation and the objective pursued.241 Each offence will now 
be considered against the question of rational connection. 
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(i) Section 101B(1) – Damage or Interference 
Under both the substantial and threshold approach, there is a rational connection between 
criminalising conduct that damages or interferes with shipping or structures involved in 
mining operations and the objectives of deterrence, safety, and procuring unimpeded 
navigation. Criminalising intentional damage or interference with these vessels or 
structures does not take into account irrelevant considerations, nor is it unfair. The 
provision is tailored to its objective as penalising conduct that intentionally damages or 
interferes with vessels or structures has a strong likelihood of deterring such conduct, 
thereby reducing the risk posed by direct action protest to safety and navigation. 
(ii) Section 101B(2) – Entry into Specified Non-interference Zones 
Criminalising entry into a specified non-interference zone will deter entry into that zone 
by protest vessels. For this reason, there is a logical relationship between criminalisation 
and a reduction in risk to safety, navigation and the promotion of prospecting, exploration 
and mining activities. Section 101B(2) therefore satisfies the threshold conception of the 
rational connection test. Additionally, it is not arbitrary, unfair, nor does it take into 
account irrelevant matters. It is also specifically tailored to meet its objectives as it further 
prevents non-violent direct action protest. Any non-violent direct action protest is likely 
to risk the safety of both parties as it necessarily involves navigation in close quarters. 
This will also impinge upon the navigation of the exploration vessel. Such protest is less 
likely to occur where clear locational restrictions are created and enforced upon the 
navigation of protest vessels. Although criminalising entry into the specified non-
interference zone would also prevent protest action that was purely communicative, and 
therefore unlikely to endanger safety or navigation, it advances the deterrence of direct 
action protest. For these reasons, both offences under s 101B are rationally connected to 
their objective.  
(b) Minimal Impairment  
The second step in the proportionality inquiry involves an assessment of whether the 
means chosen impair the rights no more “than reasonably necessary to achieve 
Parliament’s purpose”.242 Although this was described in Oakes as a requirement that the 
means impair the rights “as little as possible”, the Canadian Supreme Courts has also 
adopted a reasonableness gloss for this standard.243 This was adopted because it “builds 
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in appropriate latitude to Parliament”.244 Bearing in mind the moderate degree of 
deference due to Parliament’s assessment of the matter, the question is whether “there 
was an alternative but less intrusive means of addressing the legislature’s objective which 
would have had a similar level of effectiveness.”245 
In order to achieve Parliament’s objectives, it was necessary to criminalise intentional 
conduct that interferes with structures or ships.  It is possible to argue that the offence of 
entering a specified non-interference zone was not necessary as it restricts the expression 
and assembly rights of all protestors, not merely those engaged in direct action protest. 
This argument would assert that safety, navigation and ultimately the investment market 
would be sufficiently protected if only protest action that interferes with mining 
operations at sea were restricted. However, the stronger position is that this offence is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, especially considering the deference due 
to Parliament. The specified non-interference zones serve the purpose of achieving clarity 
with respect to the conduct required to trigger the offence, a clarity that is not imparted by 
the undefined standard of “interference” in s 101B(1). This certainty assists the 
deterrence of direct action protest because it establishes that all such conduct, relying as it 
does upon close proximity to the protested action, is illegal. As it is a strict liability 
offence, subject only to a defence of reasonable excuse, there is no ambiguity upon which 
direct action protest could be defended. Thus s 101B(1) has a preventative as opposed to 
a reactive effect. Combined with the practical costs and difficulties of enforcement of 
these laws on the oceans, this is reasonably necessary to achieve the objective of 
protecting safety and ensuring investor confidence in the offshore gas and oil market.  
The next question must be whether it was reasonably necessary for Parliament to set the 
maximum radius of the specified non-interference zone to 500 metres, or whether a lower 
maximum could have sufficiently achieved the objectives pursued. The reasons advanced 
above in relation to the necessity of the offence itself do not depend on the particular 
distance adopted. Thus the offences could have achieved their intended purpose even 
with a maximum area of less than 500 metres. However, the moderate degree of 
deference due to Parliament strongly advocates the acceptance of 500 metres as 
reasonably necessary, especially given the provisions in art 60 of UNCLOS relating to 
safety zones around structures on the continental shelf.  
The safety zones permitted by art 60 of UNCLOS shall not exceed 500 metres in radius, 
“except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended 
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by the competent international organization.”246 In recent years, the International 
Maritime Organisation has fielded requests from Brazil to extend the breadth of safety 
zones to one nautical mile around fixed structures and two nautical miles around floating 
structures.247 The Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation denied there was a 
“demonstrated need” to “establish safety zones larger than 500 metres”.248 The discussion 
by the Committee indicates that, if anything, there is an emerging movement among 
states to extend the maximum radius beyond 500 metres. The purpose of safety zones 
illustrates that the 500 metre radius is also reasonable with respect to ships. Safety zones 
were permitted under UNCLOS to enhance the safety of navigation.249 As the close 
navigation of two ships poses a greater risk to safety than the close navigation of a ship to 
a structure, it is reasonable that the 500 metre maximum radius transfers to non-
interference zones around ships. This analogous international standard, in tandem with 
the moderate deference due to Parliament, means that the minimal impairment test is 
satisfied. 
(c) Due Proportion 
The final step in the s 5 inquiry asks whether the limit placed on rights is proportionate to 
the importance of the objectives.250 This requires the importance of freedom of 
expression and assembly and the nature and extent of the limitation imposed on those 
rights to be weighed against the objectives pursued by the limitation.251 
(i) The Value of Protest at Sea 
As discussed, the rights of freedom of expression and assembly are of fundamental 
importance within New Zealand’s democratic society. The value to be attributed to the 
particular exercise of these rights depends upon the connection between the protest 
activity and the underlying rationales explored above. The stronger this connection, the 
more value ought to be attributed to that protest.252 This paper discussed the strength of 
this connection when it considered the question of whether the Amendment Act 
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constitutes a prima facie limitation upon protest rights. It has argued that political protests 
against the prospecting, exploration and mining of resources on the continental shelf 
strongly engage the democratic rationale, contribute to the marketplace of ideas, and 
advance the self-fulfillment of individual protestors. The protest action restricted by s 
101B should therefore be considered high-value speech of significant importance.253 
(ii) The Extent and Significance of the Intrusion 
Section 101B(1) completely prohibits non-violent direct action protest as such protest, by 
definition, fulfills the requirements of being intentional and having the consequence of 
interfering with the activities being carried out. In doing so, it undermines the 
contribution that non-violent direct action protest makes to the market-place of ideas, the 
promotion of an informed citizenry and the self-fulfillment of individuals.  
Criminalising entry into a specified non-interference zone also prohibits non-violent 
direct action. Moreover, to the extent that the inability to access a particular place 
restricts the ability of protestors to convey their message effectively, the rationales of 
protecting purely communicative protest are also undermined.254 Even where the intended 
audience of purely communicative protest at sea is the general public, close proximity to 
the vessels and structures may be necessary as the successful dissemination of the 
message may rely upon striking video footage that can only be obtained in that 
location.255 If that message is not conveyed, the value of the protest, grounded in its 
contribution to an informed citizenry and the marketplace of ideas, is lost. The inability to 
access a particular place also undermines the rationale of self-development by restricting 
autonomous choice as to the place of protest and indirectly restricting autonomous choice 
as to the means of protest.256 Spatial restrictions that render protest ineffectual therefore 
constitute severe infringements on the values underlying protest activity.257 The 
prohibition of entry into specified non-interference zones is a substantial interference 
with the freedom of expression and assembly of purely communicative protestors. 
(iii) Balancing the Competing Interests – Overall Proportionality 
The proportionality inquiry requires that the importance of the rights infringed and the 
extent of the infringement be weighed against competing objectives. The considerable 
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restrictions upon high-value speech are to be weighed, in this instance, against the 
competing objectives of securing economic investment, protecting the safety of vessels 
and structures at sea, and reducing interference with navigation. These objectives are 
important concerns that must not be undervalued.  
Section 101B(1) is a proportionate limitation on protest rights. It restricts high-value 
political protest, and the extent of the intrusion upon the underlying rationales is 
significant as non-violent direct action is prohibited. However, the danger posed by non-
violent direct action protest to the legitimate and important objectives justifies the 
conclusion that the interference with the rights of freedom of expression and assembly is 
proportionate to the objectives pursued. Section 101B(1) is, therefore, consistent with 
BORA as it imposes no more than a justifiable limitation on rights.  
Section 101B(2) requires a more complex analysis because criminalising entry into a 
specified non-interference zone undermines both non-violent direct action and purely 
communicative protests. Yet the competing interests of safety, navigation, and investment 
security are not significantly implicated by purely communicative protest. Nevertheless, 
for interrelated reasons, this paper concludes that the balance struck is proportionate. 
First, and from a pragmatic perspective, the costs and risks of protesting at sea are such 
that protest at sea almost inevitably employs direct action tactics. Although this does not 
detract from the extent of the infringement upon protest rights in cases of purely 
communicative protest, it does support the conclusion that the “the infringement is too 
high a price to pay for the benefit of the law.”258 Combined with the appropriate latitude 
due to Parliament, and the argument advanced earlier that non-interference zones are a 
reasonable measure by which to advance Parliament’s objectives, this factor justifies the 
conclusion that s 101B(2) is also a proportionate limitation upon protest rights.  
It follows that the offences constitute a justified and reasonable limitation upon the rights 
to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and – to the extent applicable – movement. 
For this reason, s 5 is satisfied and the Amendment Act is consistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act.  
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VI Conclusion  
The offences in the Amendment Act were introduced to deter offshore direct action 
protests. They criminalise conduct by New Zealand and foreign vessels within and 
beyond the territorial sea in such a way that limits the freedoms of navigation and protest 
Nevertheless, this paper has argued that the offences are consistent with both New 
Zealand’s jurisdiction under international law and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
The jurisdiction to enact and enforce these offences arises, in respect of New Zealand 
vessels and vessels within the territorial sea, by virtue of the principles of nationality and 
territoriality. In respect of foreign vessels beyond the territorial sea, New Zealand has 
jurisdiction because the offences are a reasonable exercise of the sovereign rights 
provided in UNCLOS for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources 
on the continental shelf. The offences in the Amendment act are also consistent with 
BORA. They limit high-value speech and infringe the rights to freedom of expression, 
peaceful assembly and – within the territorial sea – movement. However, in light of the 
moderate degree of deference due to Parliament and the costs imposed by direct action 
protest against the important objectives of safety, navigation and facilitating the 
economic exploitation of natural resources, the offences constitute no more than a 
reasonable and justified limitation upon the right to protest.  
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